DRG制度对三级医院疾病诊治难度的演化博弈及实证分析

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1006-5253.2023.02.005

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Abstract Objective To analyze the influence of DRG system on the difficulty of diagnosis and treatment of diseases in tertiary hospitals with the evolutionary game theory.Methods Through theoretical analysis of strategies and behavioral benefits of medical institutions, an evolutionary game model was constructed, the influence of various factors on the difficulty of diagnosis and treatment of hospital diseases was analyzed by software simulation, and the correctness of the model was verified by empirical analysis.Results Under normal circumstances, even if the initial proportion of departments who choose the strategy of improving the difficulty of diagnosis and treatment of diseases is only 1%, after only 6.13 simulation cycles, the strategy of improving the difficulty of diagnosis and treatment of diseases can quickly cover more than 95% of the groups. When the medical insurance rate is too low, hospitals will choose not to improve the difficulty of disease diagnosis and treatment. Empirical data prove the correctness of the evolutionary game model constructed in this study.Conclusion DRG will promote the difficulty of diagnosis and treatment of diseases in tertiary hospitals. The model constructed in this study has strong practicability in prediction, adjustment and control. The proportion of individuals adopting different initial strategies in hospital group has a great influence on evolutionary equilibrium time. It must be noted that when the medical insurance rate is too low, the hospital will choose not to the difficulty of disease diagnosis and treatment.

Key words： evolutionary game empirical analysis DRG hospital difficulty of disease diagnosis and treatment

Received: 03 November 2022

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	Fang Jinming
	Tao Hongbing

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Fang Jinming,Tao Hongbing. Evolutionary game and empirical analysis of DRG system on the difficulty of diseases diagnosis and treatment in tertiary hospitals[J]. journal1, 2023, 30(2): 106-113.

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http://manu58.magtech.com.cn/Jwk_zgyytj/EN/10.3969/j.issn.1006-5253.2023.02.005 OR http://manu58.magtech.com.cn/Jwk_zgyytj/EN/Y2023/V30/I2/106

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